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 The Civil War was a pivotal and tragic period in our country’s history. The years that 
spanned from 1860-1865 were years that were paved with the blood of American men, and what 
determined whether these men lived or died was the men who led them. Civil War leadership on 
both sides of the battlefield was critical to the success of the Union and the failure of the 
Confederacy. Success did not happen overnight, however. The road for the Union was a long and 
frustrating one, with constant changes in leadership positions and a plague of poor generals. This 
was not the case for the whole war. The Battle of Gettysburg served as a turning point for the 
Union, and the Union rode this change to an eventual victory in the war. It was more of a 
progressive turn, with the effects unseen until 1864. The Confederacy proved successful at the 
onset of the war, but again, Gettysburg was a turning point for them as well only in a negative 
sense. Gettysburg was pivotal for the victory of the Union and the failure of the Confederacy. 
The war leading up to the battle, the battle itself, and the years that followed were vial in 
showing the progression of leadership for both sides and ultimately the Union proved stronger 
after years of searching for the perfect General in Chief. It was a process to be sure, but it was a 
process that ended in the Union’s favor. 
 Before one understands the reasons that the Union proved successful, one must 
understand the background of the war, the leadership, and the tactics that they employed. Many 
historians have analyzed and studied the Civil War since the end of the 19th century and the 
beginning of the 20th century. There are a plethora of sources that talk about the Union, the 
Confederacy, the battles, the leaders, and the causes of the war. As far as leadership is concerned 
there are a few choice authors that paint a picture of what leadership was like for both sides of 
the war. There are both primary and secondary authors that effectively express how important 
leadership was and how these leaders changed the course of the war.  
 T. Harry Williams wrote the classic work on the Union leadership entitled Lincoln and 
his Generals. He tracks leadership from the start of the war until the Battle of Appomattox. He 
writes about Lincoln’s Generals in a light that exemplifies their character, their strengths, their 
weaknesses, and how they succeeded or failed. More often than not he wrote about their failures, 
which was an accurate portrayal of Union leaders before Grant took over in 1864. His main 
focuses are on the major Union Generals but he references the lesser known ones that were under 
the command of higher ranked generals. He spends a lot of time talking about a man named 
George B. McClellan and his failure as a general. He not only talks about McClellan the general, 
but he talks about McClellan the man. He references McClellan’s high view of himself1, his 
failure to gauge enemy forces effectively2, and his inactivity during pivotal battles and 
movements. 3 The only other general to receive as much study as McClellan was Grant, who was 
the antithesis of McClellan. This is vital in understanding the broader scheme of leadership 
throughout the war. The point of Williams work was to show the progression of Lincoln as a 
commander in chief, but he also showed the progression of Union leadership until it culminated 
under Grant. He argues that the path to Union victory was a steady one that evolved over time 
after a long period of frustration and failure.  
 On the Confederate side, there is a book written by a former Confederate captain named 
William P. Snow. He wrote a book called Lee and his Generals, which contains biographies and 
accounts of the various confederate generals. It was originally published in 1867 and he writes 
extensively on Lee, Jackson, and Johnston but he also writes about the other generals like 
Longstreet, Hill, and Ewell. He writes using a lot of primary documents and firsthand accounts. 
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He claims that if the Confederacy was more aggressive after Gettysburg, then they may have had 
a chance but it was that same aggression that cost them in the end. He also claims that the focus 
on the defense of Richmond and the assault on Washington was mishandled and could have been 
successful if it were not for Lee’s other generals. Observing this in the context of the rest of the 
war is important for the understanding of Lee’s leadership as well as the rest of his generals. He 
praises Lee for his strategic genius and he also praises Jackson for his offensive tenacity and 
Christian values.4 
 Ezra J. Warner wrote the books Generals in Gray and Generals in Blue. These books 
give summaries of the lives of the generals of the Civil War. His work is not extensive, but 
provides a good starting point. Another good starting book is a book by two men named R. 
Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy called The Compact History of the Civil War. This piece 
offers a good history of the war as a whole and is a good source of background and supplemental 
information about the battles and campaigns that these leaders commanded. It is written in a nice 
and succinct manner and provides a lot of the necessary information that compliments the 
biographical information that Williams and Snow present.  
Williams and Snow touch on the actual Battle of Gettysburg from the perspective of the 
generals in command. Williams keeps it brief and talks about Meade and his success there.5 
Snow writes on it from Lee’s perspective mainly but touches on it in other accounts. There is an 
author that writes an extensive account of the battle. His analysis of command at the Battle of 
Gettysburg is one that is revered in academic circles to this day. This work is The Gettysburg 
Campaign: A Study in Command by Edwin B. Coddington. His analysis of the battle is very 
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technical and written in great depth. His analysis of the three day battle is written in a day by day 
basis and discusses the strategies of both Lee and Meade when it comes to the preparations, 
strategies, and execution of the battles. His account of Cemetery Hill and Pickett’s Charge are 
written in great detail and shows the desperation of the Confederacy and the tenacity and genius 
of Meade’s defense.6 Coddington argues that the Union victory was due to their stellar defense of 
Cemetery Hill, their strategy on the third day, and the leadership of George Meade. His strategy 
to not fully retaliate against the Confederate artillery, and because of this they had the munitions 
to repel Pickett’s Charge with relative ease. 7 Another author that effectively writes on the Battle 
of Gettysburg is Stephen W. Sears and his book Gettysburg. He writes in a more general manner 
than Coddington who focuses on command. Sears tells a cohesive tale of the battle and is 
informative in his description of the event. His portrayal of Pickett’s charge is just as good as 
Coddington’s and he creates an immersive experience that engages the reader. He argues that the 
battle was a turning point in the war, and a point where the union offensive began. His main 
evidence is the leadership skills of George Meade, the Union defense, and the mistakes made by 
James Longstreet.8  
 All in all, these authors present one common theme. Leadership was critical to the 
success of an army. The Union was at its best under competent generals and its worst under 
incompetent ones. The Confederate Army for the most part was consistent with leadership, but 
did not stand a chance against a competent Union army. They were successful against bad 
generals and they underestimated the Union’s competent generals which led to their downfall. 
The Confederates had their share of blunders but they were fewer than the Union’s and came 
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closer to the end of the war. These authors support the argument that Gettysburg was indeed a 
turning point for the war in favor of the Union, and the details in their works further prove this. 
The difference between Union leadership before Gettysburg, during Gettysburg, and after 
Gettysburg is very apparent and it becomes apparent when one observes the movements of the 
Union after July of 1863. The analysis of these periods of leadership is critical to understanding 
the conflict as a whole. The same can be said of Confederate leadership, and the same analysis 
must be implemented with them as well.      
 
Section 1: Union Leadership before Gettysburg  
 The start of the Civil War marked an interesting time for the Union and its military 
leadership. It had almost no army, few leaders, and moderately effective weapons. An army was 
drafted and munitions were created fairly quickly, but leadership was a whole different story. 
Union leadership at its finest didn’t emerge until 1864.9 Until then, the Union faced the struggle 
of poor leadership from many of its generals until it began to improve in July of 1863 and peaked 
in 1864.  
 The first general in chief was a man named Winfield Scott. He was a veteran of the War 
of 1812 and the Mexican War and was a distinguished general. He envisioned a four year war 
and came up with the “Anaconda plan” which was the inspiration for Grant’s strategy in 1864-
1865. At the outbreak of the war, he was 75 years old and couldn’t ride into battle. 10 The other 
general of note in the early part of the war was a man named John E. Wool. He was two years 
older than Scott and also showed signs of aging. He often repeated things that he had said a few 
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minutes prior, suffered from shaking of the hands that was so bad that he needed aides to put his 
hat on straight.  T. Harry Williams wrote that there was “Not an officer in the first year of the 
war who was capable of efficiently administering and fighting a large army.”11 He references the 
fact that they only had knowledge of smaller forces, they lacked of topographical awareness, and 
they suffered from poor planning.12 This idea holds true, especially when a general by the name 
of George B. McClellan enters the picture.  
 McClellan had a very interesting military career. Lincoln and Scott had developed a plan 
to blockade the South and to cut off resources. Lincoln realized how important the State of 
Mississippi was to the success of their plan, so he implemented a strategy known as the 
Mississippi Campaign and placed McClellan in charge of it. This was in May of 1861 and Scott 
expressed concerns about his own campaign, which is a telltale sign of his lack of leadership 
prowess. He wrote to McClellan saying not to invade the South. He wrote, “the great danger now 
pressing upon us-the impatience of our patriotic and loyal Union friends. They will urge instant 
vigorous action….”13   
It was after this that Lincoln appointed a man named Irvin McDowell, who was a 
commander of the regulars, to lead the newly formed Army of the Potomac. This differed from 
McClellan’s role, which was the command of the forces drafted for the Mississippi Campaign. 
McDowell went on to have a very tragic and awful military career. He had promise, he was 
honest and humble, but everything he tried ended in failure. He was the first American general to 
command an army of 30,000 men and he did not know what to do with them. He had a small 
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staff that lacked experience, a bad map of Virginia and a young army to train. This was a bad 
start for a young general.14   His first and only battle test was at the First Battle of Manassas. 
Lincoln wanted McDowell to move and crush the Confederates at Manassas. McDowell 
presented a plan to flank the Confederate army out of their defensive works and hopefully cut off 
reinforcements. McDowell’s fatal flaw, however, was that he was not confident in the plan that 
he drafted.15 When a soldier does not believe in his own strategy, then problems are sure to arise. 
The Battle of Manassas was a disaster for the Union. Delays in movements and attacks alongside 
weak preliminary attacks against P.G.T. Beauregard and Joseph Johnston gave the Confederates 
an early advantage. By the time Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson arrived with confederate 
reinforcements, the battle had been lost. The confederates were victorious at Manassas and 
McDowell was left to ponder his failure.16 McDowell was relieved of command and it was 
passed on to George B. McClellan.  
 Lincoln invited McClellan to a cabinet meeting shortly before he was appointed. Scott 
was not extended the same invitation, which made him quite angry. McClellan wrote about this 
event in his memoirs aptly titled Own Story.  He met with Scott and after conversing with him he 
mentioned that he had a meeting with the president and had to leave. He wrote “Upon this the 
general became quite indignant and said that it is highly improper that I should receive such an 
invitation to his exclusion…”17 Scott then told him to round up stragglers and send them back to 
their camps, which caused McClellan to be late to his appointment with Lincoln. McClellan said 
that he “later explained to President later in the day the cause of my apparent lack of courtesy…” 
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 which shows his pride and the joy he had in gaining a level of status that Scott did not have. 
McClellan saw Lincoln as a person of inferior abilities, which speaks volumes of McClellan’s 
view of himself. He held himself much higher than he should have. This showed in the way that 
he talked about Lincoln, calling him a “hostile and boring oaf”.19 He was a natural patronizer and 
often looked down on others. His early promotions at the onset of the war, the fact that his 
soldiers loved him, and the public’s search for a hero only fueled his hubris. Williams argues that 
if he had some humbling reverses in his early years, he would have been a better general, 
especially if he met circumstances of potential or even actual defeat in battle.20 On the positive 
side, he was very affluent in the training of soldiers, and he quickly gained the respect of his 
soldiers. These positives do not outweigh his negatives though. He had a messianic complex, 
which showed even in the writings to his wife. He wrote in a letter to her, “my previous life 
seems, to have been unwittingly directed to this end….”21  His confidence would be tested when 
he went to Lincoln with a plan to quell the rebellion in one blow. He had the idea to amass 
273,000 troops to march on Richmond. This plan was defective in many regards according to 
Williams. It called for a mass concentration in one theatre of war leaving the others neglected. 
He also failed to realize that the government could not recruit an army of that magnitude quickly 
and even if they could, it would not be able to house, feed, and transport them.22  
 While this was going on in the East, Lincoln was beginning to make plans for the West. 
He appointed John C. Fremont as the commander of the Western Army. A veteran of the 
Mexican War, he was much like McClellan in the fact that he was young and charismatic. 
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Lincoln gave him carte blanche in the west and unfortunately Fremont was not a successful 
general despite his unlimited budget. His military failures were too great, and it cost him his 
command. These failures included inefficiency of resources; he worked with some unscrupulous 
weapons contractors and failed to keep supplies plentiful for his troops. His biggest failure was 
losing a garrison in St. Louis to the Confederates, and thus allowing them to become more active 
in Missouri. This pained Lincoln and Fremont was removed from command. He was replaced by 
David Hunter, who would not stay in command long.23    
  After the failures in the West, Lincoln turned to the East and to McClellan. He would be 
in command from October 1861 until November 1862. His career would be marked with fear, 
political manipulation, inaction, and overall poor leadership.  The Senate, along with Lincoln, 
was pressuring McClellan to move, and McClellan answered accusations of inaction by asking 
for more time to train troops. He blamed Scott for the political pressure, claiming that it was 
controlling his young genius and hindering his plans for the Army of the Potomac. He moved to 
have Scott retired. Scott was willing to retire, but was unwilling to give McClellan his office. 
Lincoln wrote McClellan on November 1, 1861 naming him to “command the whole army,”24 
which was the position of General in Chief. His attitude towards Lincoln remained the same 
despite his promotion. He had a positive view of Lincoln if Lincoln did not exercise control over 
him. After his promotion, McClellan then proceeded to name two new generals in the west. He 
named Henry W. Halleck and Don Carlos Buell to command the two departments in the west. 
Halleck was charged with concentrating forces in Mississippi after the failures of Fremont, and 
he told Buell to hold Kentucky.25 Buell was like McClellan but without the charisma. He was 
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cold, reserved, and prone to inaction. Lincoln wanted Buell to attack Knoxville the Fall of 1861, 
but Buell saw that he could not take Eastern Tennessee by invading from the north. He proposed 
simultaneous movement by his forces along with Halleck’s to take Eastern Tennessee. Halleck 
was to come from Western Kentucky up through the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers while 
Buell came from Nashville.26 McClellan had a different plan however. He wanted Buell to move 
to East Tennessee to aid his own operations in Virginia.27 He was planning a campaign against 
Richmond.  
He started his command wanting to advance against Manassas, which was en route to 
Richmond, but was held up by his own fear and aversion to making key decisions. He had a 
tendency to overestimate the enemy and see obstacles that were not there. This was his biggest 
weakness as a soldier, and he tended to make matters worse for himself. One such example is 
when he hired Allen Pinkerton to gather intelligence on the Confederate forces in Virginia. 
McClellan was plagued with the worst intelligence service of any general to that point. Pinkerton 
returned with figures of 80,000-90,000 men in Manassas and 126,000 troops total in Virginia. 
This intelligence was so poor that McClellan asked Lincoln for more troops in order to delay 
advancing.28 His excuses for this delay were road conditions, the need for further training of his 
troops, and Buell not being ready in East Tennessee. He turned the blame on the government, 
claiming that they were withholding resources from him.29 He wrote to his wife saying “I have a 
set of men to deal with unscrupulous and false; if possible they will throw whatever blame there 
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is on my shoulders, and I do not intend to be sacrificed by such people.”30 His master plan was to 
capture Richmond without fighting a battle. He wanted to transport his troops by water down the 
Potomac River and the Chesapeake Bay to the mouth of the Rappahannock River, then land at 
Urbana which was northeast of Richmond. He would then attack Richmond before the troops at 
Manassas could return.31  
He did not tell Lincoln about this plan, but in December of 1861 Lincoln wrote 
McClellan with a plan of his own. He wanted a joint frontal and flank attack at Manassas.32 
McClellan disapproved of the plan, but took the hint and told Lincoln about the Urbana scheme. 
He initially wanted to move immediately but the weather turned bad, and he became ill with 
typhoid fever. He actually had a legitimate excuse for a delay this time. While he was ill, Lincoln 
began to coordinate a joint movement with Buell and Halleck. He wanted Halleck and Buell to 
move on Bowling Green33 but Halleck lacked the resources. Lincoln wanted to move on 
Knoxville but they could not work together effectively.  
McClellan pressured Buell and Halleck to do something soon. He told them that he was 
feeling great pressure from the government for an advance and that he needed to coordinate one 
soon. He wrote Halleck the same thing.34 Lincoln proposed that Halleck attack the confederate 
forces in western Kentucky while Buell menaced Eastern Kentucky and Eastern Tennessee.35 
Buell did eventually attack Eastern Kentucky and gained a victory at Mill Springs but could not 
advance after that. Halleck then decided to attack Fort Henry with Grant’s forces. He failed to 
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inform Buell of this attack until he needed his troops for a diversion. Buell made excuses not to 
aid him and moved toward Nashville instead. Grant gained the victory not only at Fort Henry but 
at Fort Donelson as well, but Halleck tried to claim all of the credit for this victory. Grant was 
promoted to major general, and Lincoln began to take an interest in Grant.36 At this point, very 
little has been accomplished in the East. In the West, there are traces of victory coming from 
Grant. Lincoln begins to watch Grant with great interest, which will contrast his displeasure that 
he will feel with McClellan.     
 The rest of McClellan’s military career was plagued with mistakes, namely due to bad 
intelligence and lack of action. There are several instances where this is the case. In February of 
1862, Lincoln wrote General War Order Number One, with the purpose getting McClellan to 
take action. The winter months were unproductive; no strikes were made and no offensives were 
executed. McClellan brought back up the Urbana Plan, and Lincoln eventually yielded.  
Williams argues that Lincoln made a mistake going with a plan that he distrusted; he should have 
asked McClellan to draft another plan or he simply should have relieved him of command. 
McClellan could have taken Manassas and regained Lincoln’s trust but he decided to fight for a 
plan that Lincoln, Halleck, and the Senate objected. This showed McClellan’s inability to lead 
and work with others.37 McClellan moved forward with the Urbana plan but received 
discouraging news on March 9, 1962. The news that came to him was that the Confederates had 
evacuated Manassas and Centreville and retreated. This made his Urbana Plan useless because 
this put the Confederate defenses behind the Rappahannock. He marched his troops out and 
occupied the abandoned positions. 38Lincoln took this opportunity to relieve McClellan as 
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general in chief, but he retained him as leader of the Army of the Potomac. Lincoln said that 
McClellan could earn back his office if he captured Richmond. 39 This is an interesting move by 
Lincoln. He grew tired of McClellan’s inaction and failures, yet retained him in a position of 
command. This shows that part of Lincoln still had faith in McClellan, but the other parts of him 
were cautious. He kept McClellan very close to him so that he could observe him more closely, 
hoping that McClellan would do better with a more focused position of command, without the 
political strife. Lincoln would eventually have his worst fears regarding McClellan realized.  
 While this was going on, things began stirring in the West. Halleck began moving 
Grant’s troops up the Tennessee river, and because he had not received correspondence from 
Grant was about to relieve him from duty. Grant had gone and joined up with Buell without his 
permission. This culminated at the Battle of Shiloh, which almost ended in Grant’s defeat. He 
was able to repel the confederates with aid from Buell. Grant made a grave error in relying on his 
enemy to do what he wanted, which was to wait for him to attack. He was successful, however, 
and Lincoln took notice saying that he couldn’t lose Grant because he was a fighter.40  
 In April of 1862, McClellan began a siege on Yorktown instead of attacking outright. He 
had superior numbers, and could have broken through the lines and driven up the Peninsula but 
decided to implement a siege that lasted a month and gave the confederates a chance to regroup. 
When he did plan an invasion of Yorktown, he wanted to take it with the aid of the Navy and 
flank them from the river. When he arrived at Fortress Monroe, he found out that the navy could 
not cooperate, so he decided to send McDowell and his forces up the north side but McDowell 
was detained in Washington. When the month was over he was ready to attack, but the 
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Confederates held him back until May 5th when they fell back up the peninsula.41 This began his 
slow movement towards Richmond, meeting little resistance because Joseph Johnston wanted a 
decisive battle for Richmond. This is when McClellan’s famous nervousness came back into 
play. He once again overestimated the forces, and was not pleased with the forces he received 
from McDowell.42 Jackson caught wind of McClellan’s reinforcements and moved towards 
Washington beating back Fremont’s army. Lincoln had to bring McDowell back to Washington 
to defend it, much to the chagrin of McClellan43 Lincoln planned to use McDowell and Fremont 
to capture Jackson and end the assault on Washington. While they were able to push back 
Jackson’s forces, they were unable to capture him. Lincoln’s plan failed and the confederate plan 
to stop McDowell from reaching McClellan succeeded. While this was happening, McClellan 
was moving towards Richmond. He was attacked on May 31 and June 1 of 1862 at the 
Chickahominy.  
The Battle of Seven Pines drove back federal forces but McClellan was able to bring 
them back over the north side and regain the lost ground. This battle almost ruined him as a 
general according to Williams. He writes that this battle revealed another weakness of his, he 
loved his soldiers too much.44 McClellan wrote to his wife describing the battlefield and how it 
sickened him with its “mangled corpses” and “screaming wounded.”45 When McClellan received 
word that Jackson was receiving 10,000 reinforcements from Richmond, Lincoln told him to 
attack Richmond. McClellan did not attack because he received word that Jackson reinforced 
Richmond with 200,000 troops but this was another example of bad intelligence. This delay led 
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to the Union being attacked by an all-out offensive. McClellan was able to repel the offensive, 
yet he did not attack Richmond. On the second day, Lee forced McClellan back to the James. 
The third day resulted in McClellan repelling Lee, but McClellan did not counterattack. His 
reason for not attacking was that he claimed his state of mind, not being in an offensive state 
after the battle, thought that he was fighting an enemy that was twice his size and that he needed 
massive numbers of reinforcements. He accused the government of sacrificing the Potomac.46 
This was around the time that Halleck was named general in chief and his first order was for 
McClellan to take Richmond. Due to the fact that McClellan needed more reinforcements than 
they could spare, Lincoln and Halleck pulled him back to the James. The Union would not reach 
Richmond until 1864. This is another prime example of McClellan’s inaction that was caused by 
fear. 
 The end of McClellan’s career was due to his slow progress. After the failure of John 
Pope at Manassas, he began to pressure Halleck more. Manassas began when Lee pursued 
McClellan after he pulled back and met Pope’s forces at Manassas. McClellan was placed in 
charge of reinforcements for Pope. Pope was able to repel the confederate army, but was overrun 
when he pursued them.47 Pope had the faults of McClellan but in reverse according to Williams. 
He underestimated enemy forces and was too brash in his offensive maneuvers.48 Pope blamed 
McClellan for his defeat because he thought that McClellan held back reinforcements. Lincoln 
decided that McClellan was not at fault. Lincoln then proceeded to relieve Pope of command on 
September 5. Lincoln wanted to appoint Burnsides as General of the Army of the Potomac but he 
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refused the command, forcing Lincoln to give the role to McClellan. McClellan met Lee at 
Antietam, and should have destroyed him. All he had to do was move rapidly and interpose Lee 
and Jackson’s lines and separate them. He waited too long and when he reached Antietam, Lee 
was ready for him. He had an opportunity to gain ultimate victory; all he had to do was attack 
them before they could cross the creek. He decided to attack them from the left, then the right, 
then right up the center if the first two succeeded. The left flank was successful and he was on 
the verge of victory but he did not send in the reserve force on the right and did not cover the 
retreat. Victory was in his grasp and he could have ended the war, yet he chose to hold back.49 
McClellan did not pursue him across the Potomac until after November of 1862, which was too 
late for him. Lincoln relieved him of command on November 7, 1862.50 McClellan would not 
hold military command for the rest of the war. McClellan’s failure was of his own doing. He did 
not listen to Lincoln’s calls to advance, and his fear led to his inaction. This would be the case 
for the Union Army for the rest of 1862 and even into the first half of 1863.  
 Three more generals would be removed before July of 1863. Ambrose E. Burnsides 
replaced McClellan and was in command until December of 1862. His failure at Fredericksburg 
was his undoing. He wanted a decisive battle there on confederate soil but this proved to be 
disastrous. He never gained any ground and was forced backwards towards Manassas as a result. 
After the loss, he asked to be removed. He was replaced by Joseph Hooker.51  
Before this, Buell was relieved because the confederates invaded Kentucky and Buell 
was forced to leave Tennessee. His slow movement was his undoing as well. He was granted one 
final chance at Perryville but that battle ended in a draw. He was officially relieved of command 
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in October of 1862.52  Grant at this time began his assault on Vicksburg. In January of 1863, he 
tried to take it multiple times and each time he failed. He tried various means like moving from 
Memphis through Mississippi, digging canals across the peninsula on the opposite side of 
Vicksburg, invading from the north, having the Navy ascend through the Red River, and entering 
through Mississippi. All these plans failed, so he took the rest of the winter to plan his next 
assault. He used the time to dig canals and implement small raids to keep the enemy busy while 
he planned his offensive.53 In April of 1863, Grant moved toward his objective. He planned to 
have his Navy run past Vicksburg’s batteries and proceed to a point below the city. If they made 
it safely, then Grant would meet them on the west bank and have them transport troops to the 
east side. By April 30, he was ready to strike. He was supposed to receive reinforcement from 
Nathaniel P. Banks, but Banks moved on Port Hudson instead and insisted that Grant join him. 
He wrote, “The only course for me, failing in co-operation with you, is to regain the Mississippi 
and attack Port Hudson, or to move against the enemy at Shreveport. Port Hudson is reduced in 
force, but not as you are informed. It has now 10,000 men, and is very strongly fortified.”54 
Grant moved on Vicksburg and defeated the enemy forces that intercepted him. He laid siege to 
Vicksburg, and success was promising. During this ordeal one of his officers, John A. 
McClernand, gave false reports about Grant and how he effected a lodgment in the enemy works 
and decided to delay action until the siege ended. He was jealous of Grant and was convinced 
that the river victory was his doing. He decided to write an address saying that his corps had 
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done the most fighting in the recent movements and deserved the credit. Grant caught wind of 
this and, with permission from Lincoln, relieved him of command.55  
Meanwhile in the East, Hooker was planning his spring campaign. He proposed an attack 
to destroy confederate supply lines in Virginia. Lincoln approved this plan, but it ultimately 
failed due to April rains in Virginia. He then drafted a new plan; he would threaten Lee’s left by 
attacking Fredericksburg and by applying pressure to Lee he would either destroy their 
communications or force him to retreat. He moved on Fredericksburg on May 1; all he had to do 
was keep moving and crush the confederate line between his superior forces. Like McClellan and 
Burnsides before him, however, he began to lose his nerve. Lee answered his advance with an 
attack from the west, and forced Hooker back towards Chancellorsville. On May 2, the 
confederates assaulted Chancellorsville.56 Hooker was in good position at the end of the day, and 
if he counterattacked he might still have won. He instead decided to fall back against the river, 
which allowed Lee to unite his forces. He was injured on May 3 when a cannon shot hit a porch 
he was standing on causing a pillar to fall. After this injury, he ordered the army to retreat to the 
north side of the river. After the failure in Chancellorsville, Hooker wanted to move across the 
Rappahannock and attacked Lee at Fredericksburg. In June of 1863, Lee began his movement 
that would culminate at Gettysburg. Hooker petitioned Lincoln to let him attack Fredericksburg, 
but his plan was flawed. He wanted to meet the army in order to destroy a rear unit of little 
consequence. He wanted to sacrifice his main objective for a minor one. After Lincoln denied his 
plan, he decided to move on Richmond instead.57 Lincoln wanted him to focus on defeating Lee, 
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not capturing Richmond.58 Hooker, like McClellan, saw Richmond as the way to end the war. 
They did not see that if they destroyed Lee, they essentially destroyed the Confederate Army. 
Lincoln had this insight early, but his generals did not. Hooker eventually yielded, but as he 
advanced he began to become nervous again. Much like McClellan he was afraid to attack Lee, 
so much so that he asked to be relieved of command.59  Lincoln relieved him and placed Meade 
in his stead.  
 The analysis of Union generals from 1861 to July of 1863 can be summed up in a few 
ideas. First, there was a great deal of inner conflict within the Union Army. McClellan was at 
odds with Lincoln most of his career. Grant had issues with other officers like Halleck, 
McClernand and Banks. Hooker was reluctant to listen to Lincoln and all of the generals that lost 
their command at one point or another acted in their own interests and plans instead of listening 
to Lincoln. Second, fear and inactivity was the downfall of many of these generals. McClellan, 
Hooker, Fremont, Burnsides, and Hooker all suffered from the same weakness, fear. They were 
inactive because they were afraid of failure and this cost the Union dearly and extended the war 
as a consequence. Poor intelligence, poor strategy, and pride were other factors but they all 
stemmed from the same root cause, which was fear. The Union unfortunately did not realize this 
until July of 1863, when the Battle of Gettysburg took place. The Confederates had advanced so 
far that morale was low, and the cause seemed futile. However, this is when Union leadership 
flourished and began to turn. In order to understand how bad the Union leadership was at this 
time, one must contrast these leaders with the Confederate leaders of this time; leaders like 
Jackson, Lee, Longstreet, and others. One key difference will be apparent upfront. These leaders 
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were not afraid to take risks and not afraid to lose. This will show in the lives and careers of 
these generals.  
Section 2: Confederate Leaders before Gettysburg. 
 One of the first confederate generals of note was Peter Beauregard. He was responsible 
for the victory at Fort Sumter, which started the war. He was a veteran of the Mexican War, and 
when the confederacy began, he wrote General Robert Anderson demanding that Sumter be 
evacuated saying that if they did not evacuate that he would fire on them. Anderson refused 
writing, “I regret that my sense of honor and my obligations to my Government prevent my 
compliance.”60 Beauregard answered this letter giving them a second chance to evacuate stating, 
“If you will state the time at which you will evacuate Fort Sumter and agree that, in the 
meanwhile, you will not use your guns against us, unless ours shall be employed against Fort 
Sumter, we will abstain from opening fire on you.”61 Anderson did not comply and Beauregard 
had his officers write him on April 12, 1861 saying that within the hour they would fire on Ft. 
Sumter. Beauregard recalls the event, describing the batteries that fired on Sumter, explaining 
that they fired steadily throughout the day but slowed it during the night.62 On April 13, he 
opened a vigorous volley on the fort and they won the day.63  At the beginning of June 1861, 
Beauregard was in Richmond with Lee and Jefferson Davis keeping tabs with Johnston who was 
at Harper’s Ferry at the time. On June 5th, he assumed command at the Manassas Gap railroad 
junction and led a regiment there. A southern newspaper wrote this about him. It said, “the 
Leading characteristic of General Beauregard’s mind is clearness and perception.”64  He was 
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involved in the First Bull Run along with Johnston. He was mainly a supporting general, in 
charge of reinforcements. His expertise aided Johnston and Jackson in their victory at Bull Run. 
He then petitioned Davis to allow him to advance on Washington, but Davis denied him. Early in 
1862, after the confederacy evacuated Manassas, Beauregard was reassigned to the Dept. of 
Mississippi.65 He was in Nashville by February 3rd and shortly after assumed command in 
Mississippi. He received notice that Grant had attacked Pittsburg. He sent his army to combat 
Grant at Shiloh, and the results for Beauregard were disastrous. The battle seemed to be going in 
their favor, until Buell arrived with reinforcements. Braxton Bragg was in charge of making sure 
that Buell’s reinforcements did not arrive by the river, and when he failed to do so the battle was 
chaotic. Steamers brought in Union troops until there were 23,000 new troops on the field for the 
Union. On the second day of the Battle of Shiloh, Beauregard had a renewed sense of 
confidence, he thought that he could end the battle and destroy the western Union army that day. 
He expected the Union soldiers to have evacuated downriver overnight, but Grant had not. 
Beauregard was met with reinforcements and was pushed back. The Confederates lost all 
progress that day.66   Commander Albert Johnson was killed in the ensuing battle, and 
Beauregard assumed command of Johnson’s forces. After this, Halleck and Pope began to move 
towards New Orleans, and would pass through Corinth on the way. Beauregard fell back to 
Corinth to regroup. On May 30th, with Halleck’s forces close to Corinth, he evacuated his troops 
from Corinth. This was a controversial decision and was met with scrutiny. A writer at the time 
thought that if Halleck did attack then he would have been destroyed. Beauregard had Corinth 
well-fortified and could have defended against him but he did not.67 Beauregard then turned over 
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his command to Bragg for health reasons and took a command position in Charleston until 1864. 
He was in charge of the defense of Charleston and command of the forces therein. Beauregard 
was a prime example of a great general from a previous war that did not meet the expectations 
set in this war. Despite this, he was a successful general because he was willing to take risks and 
was not afraid to engage the enemy. The Union could not say the same thing at this time. 
 Another general that was at Bull Run was a man by the name of Thomas Jackson, known 
more famously as “Stonewall” Jackson. This battle is where he became a legend. He formed his 
brigade on the northeastern side of the Henry House Hill, to cover the retreat of Southern troops. 
His army repelled the Union forces in pursuit. This is where Barnard Bee’s famous quote comes 
from, “There stands Jackson like a stone wall.” The Confederacy was victorious that day.68  
Jackson’s wife recorded his account of the battle, saying the troops were panicking. They rode to 
Jackson saying that the Union was beating them back, and Jackson told them to “give them the 
bayonet.” She wrote that his “cool reply showed the unconquered mind of one who never knew 
that he was beaten.”69 He was briefly given command of Harper’s Ferry in May 1861, but that 
command was relinquished to Johnston. He was promoted to brigadier general shortly after and 
began his campaign into the Shenendoah Valley. He met Shields along the Potomac and had to 
evacuate Winchester in order to reinforce Johnston. On May 15, he began marching back 
towards Winchester. He defeated the Union troops at Front Royal and moved towards 
Winchester, eventually capturing it on May 26.70 He was swift and tenacious in his campaign, 
giving up no ground and pushing the enemy back. He was pivotal in the victory of the Seven 
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Days battle when he joined up with Lee to push back McClellan. He seemed to thrive under 
independent command, which showed when he routed Pope at the Second Battle of Manassas. 
He was nearly defeated when his Stonewall Brigade was overrun, but he sent in reinforcements 
from A.P. Hill and repelled the advance.71 This battle ended in victory for the Confederacy.  
 When Lee reorganized the Army of Northern Virginia in 1862, Jackson was promoted to 
Lieutenant General. His next major battle would be at Fredericksburg, on Dec. 13. He was in 
charge of the right and held his position aiding the confederate victory.72 As the confederates 
pushed north, they arrived at Chancellorsville, which would prove to be Jackson’s final battle. 
On May 1, 1863, Jackson arrived at Chancellorsville. After Hooker retreated behind the river, 
they began to advance. On May 2, Jackson’s foot cavalry disappeared into the woods and 
attacked the Union right. His wagon train was briefly endangered but he dispatched two 
regiments to defend it and it got through unscathed. By the end of the day, he came down upon 
the Union line. As night fell, he hoped to cut off Hooker from his communications with the 
Rappahannock. As he was riding, he was shot by a North Carolina regiment mistaking him for a 
federal cavalry detachment.73  Mrs. Jackson writes about this stating that he was riding with great 
enthusiasm and as he was fired upon, he told a soldier “there is no danger” and to “go back and 
tell General Hill to press on,” This is when he was shot.74  He died of his wounds four days later. 
Jackson was a different kind of general. He displayed the characteristics of leadership that the 
Union had only seen in Grant at this point. He was strong, steadfast, willing to take risks, and yet 
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loved his men. He was willing to do whatever it took to attain victory, and his death was very 
costly for the Confederates.   
 Now the most famous of the Confederate Generals is Robert E. Lee. He is known for his 
military genius, brilliant tactics, and tenacity during his career as a general. He was one of the 
few southern leaders to receive a generalship at the beginning of the war without actually 
fighting. He provided military advising to Jefferson Davis and was very successful on the 
battlefield. One interesting fact is that the main reason he joined the Confederacy was his loyalty 
to his home state of Virginia. When Virginia seceded, he joined the Confederate Army.75 Lee 
wrote “Save in defense of my native state, I never desire again to draw my sword.”76 He would 
indeed have to draw his sword as it were, and in defense of his home state as Virginia would 
become a major battleground in the war. One of his first acts as an officer was to fortify 
Arlington Heights. The purpose of this was to make sure this central part of Virginia was safe, 
but the main task for Lee was to train the Southern troops for war.77 After the events of Bull Run, 
Lee was sent to the West for a time to replace General Richard Garnett after his death. He was 
sent there to drive the Union out and march back into Northwest Virginia. This plan failed, so 
Lee moved towards the Kanawha region to reinforce the Confederate generals there and drive the 
Union back to the western borders of Virginia. This did not happen until October of 1861, when 
Lee was able to push the Union forces back toward Ohio, yet he was unable to pursue them due 
to road conditions.78 When McClellan was closing in on Richmond, Lee began to devise a 
defensive strategy. His time of ultimate command was drawing near on the day of the Battle of 
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Seven Pines. Johnston attacked the Union forces but was injured during the retreat after 
McClellan’s troops arrived. The outcome of Seven Pines was not in favor of the Confederates; 
the Union had maintained their ground and hope seemed lost for the Confederates. This is when 
Jefferson Davis named Lee commander in chief and commander of the Army of Northern 
Virginia. He gave a speech that in essence stated that this was the final retreat and everyone’s 
phrase should be “Victory or Death.”79 This is when things began, ever so slowly, to change for 
Lee. He hatched a plan to bring Jackson down on the Union’s left flank, and to trick McClellan 
into thinking that he was planning to invade Maryland by way of Harper’s Ferry and advance 
towards Washington. This is a prime example of his tenacity, he was willing to sacrifice 
anything for victory. 
 In order to do this, Lee needed to make some changes in order to increase effectiveness 
and morale. One important thing that Lee did was reorganize his army. He removed their camps 
from the swamps and placed them in healthy situations, he made sure that supplies were plentiful 
and wholesome, and listened to his men. Dissatisfaction and mutiny was almost eliminated 
completely from his ranks. On June 26, Jackson arrived at Ashland and began his movements 
towards the Chickahominy River. He quickly encountered Union forces, drove them back, and 
continued his march towards Mechanicsville. The Union was heavily fortified there and they 
were unable to overcome their forces.80  
 One of Lee’s biggest victories was his defense of Richmond in late June and early July of 
1862. On June 28th and 29th, he was successful in driving back McClellan with aid of Jackson. 
He also cut off supplies for McClellan that were arriving from Washington. On June 30th, 
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Jackson crossed the Chickahominy and met the Union forces at Williamsburg. A long artillery 
fight ensued and the federals fell back once again. Lee was on the field for this battle, pushing 
his men forward and encouraging them to advance. On July 1st, he oversaw the pursuit of the 
Union and a bloody battle at Malvern Hill ensued. His losses were heavy and victory was not 
obtained, but he was successful in driving back the Union from the Confederate capital.81 His 
defense of Richmond would be remembered as a great example of his leadership prowess and 
military genius. 
 The next major conflict that Lee would participate in was the Second Battle of Manassas. 
This took place after Jackson successfully invaded from behind the Union lines and pushing 
them back towards Manassas. Batteries were placed between Jackson’s and Longstreet’s lines 
right in the center where Lee was. Artillery fire began the conflict, but the real conflict came in 
the afternoon of August 30, 1862. Lee sent Jackson to rake the enemy, which resulted in Jackson 
breaking lines several times and rallying several times as well. As they fell back towards 
Manassas, the Union pursued them. This is when the Confederate artillery opened fire on them, 
and after a few Union rallies they began to give way. Jackson and Longstreet attacked from both 
sides and Lee came up through the center. They pushed the Union back and once the Union 
destroyed the bridge on the edge of Manassas, the pursuit ended. The Confederates were 
victorious.82 This was another famous example of Lee’s military genius.   
 The next stage of the war showed Lee’s military genius and his thirst for the capture of 
Maryland. His invasion of Harper’s Ferry and his assault on Washington proved to be risky 
maneuvers. He was unable to take Washington, but he gave no ground after the battle was over. 
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This brought the conflict to Antietam Creek, where Lee met McClellan for the bloodiest battle of 
the war. The stakes were high, McClellan’s forces outnumbered their forces 86,000 to 40,000 
and if they lost the end of the war was a potential concern for them. The battle began at dawn on 
September 17, 1862. Lee first met resistance from Hooker on his left. They were pushed back to 
Dunker Church, but they rebounded when reinforcements arrived though at heavy costs. The 
slaughter continued throughout the day, the Confederates held their line until noon when they 
were pushed back. There was a hole in their lines that the Union tried to capitalize on, but Lee 
sent Hill to fill that gap. They held their ground until ammunition reserves became scarce, and 
they retreated back across the creek. They were not pursued and because of this, reinforcements 
were able to arrive and push Burnside back to the starting point. No ground was gained or 
given.83  
After the stalemate of Antietam, Lee faced a new danger. Burnside was beginning to move again 
towards Richmond through Fredericksburg. The battle that ensued, much like the events that 
Jackson encountered above, resulted in the defense of Fredericksburg and the retreat of the 
Union. As the confederacy pursued the Union, they came upon the place of Lee’s finest hour, 
Chancellorsville. When the Union met the Confederacy at Chancellorsville on May 1,1863 a 
bloody battle ensued. Hooker pushed with great intensity the day before and had made great 
strides. Then he came upon five confederate divisions. Hooker was forced to retreat and Lee 
pursued immediately. He created a line that was two and a half miles wide and sent Jackson to 
attack their right flank. By the end of May 2, Jackson had routed the enemy and began pursuing 
them. Lee was holding the field when he received word that Jackson had fallen. On May 3, he 
renewed the attack and pushed back Union forces. The battle moved into May 4, but it mostly 
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consisted of the pursuit of the Union away from Chancellorsville.84 This was his finest hour, 
because at his point he had the Union in full retreat. This would be the only part of the war where 
he would have this much control of the momentum of the war. Lee had lost one of his best 
generals in this battle, and he knew that this would change things. This is when he began his 
Pennsylvania campaign. He marched north without much resistance and came to the place that 
would change the course of the war, Gettysburg Pennsylvania.  
 The confederate generals of note before Gettysburg had a few common traits. They were 
strong in the face of danger, and never wavered. They fought until the battle was over and were 
quick to capitalize on advantages that were presented to them. Jackson and Lee especially 
exemplified this skill. They had the opposite traits of McClellan, Burnside, and Hooker. They 
fought, kept calm in the face of danger, and made sure that they gave their all even in the midst 
of defeat. There was no quarrel of note between generals and that increased effectiveness. Lee 
would carry this ideal into Gettysburg, and this is also when the Union realized that they needed 
strong leaders that emulated the traits of Lee and Jackson. They would find those traits in Meade, 
Grant, and Sherman but not until after this major event. 
Section 3: The Battle of Gettysburg 
As the confederates were closing in on Gettysburg, Lincoln had just appointed General 
George Meade as the Commander of the Army of the Potomac. Lee had stopped three quarters of 
a mile away from Gettysburg on June 26, 1863. The battle did not start until July 1, 1863. The 
first day’s key players on the Union side were Generals John Buford, John F. Reynolds, 
Lysander Cutler, Rufus Dawes, and Abner Doubleday. The major players on the Confederate 
                                                          
84
R. Ernest Dupuy, Trevor N. Dupoy, The Compact History of the Civil War, (New York, Hawthorn Books Inc., 1960) 
p.203-207  
side were John Blair, James Longstreet, Alfred Iverson, Robert Rodes, and Julius Daniel. The 
battle would take place around McPherson’s Ridge, Chambersburg Pike, and end at Cemetery 
Hill outside of Gettysburg. The first day was mainly a day that Meade and Lee took to observe 
each other’s tactics. Ground was neither gained nor lost for both sides and casualties were 
minimal.  
 
The day began with General John Buford arriving at Gettysburg. The confederates 
thought that the Union had arrived with only a small force, so they resorted to flanking 
movements complimented by frontal assaults. The Union answered the assault with cannon fire 
but pressure became too great and Buford fell back towards McPherson’s ridge. General John F. 
Reynolds soon arrived, and ordered Buford to hold the line. Norman Hall, around 10:45, opened 
fire which allowed the troops led by Lysander Cutler to arrive in formation.85 He was the first to 
arrive with two regiments from New York and he was placed there in order to cover McPhersons 
Ridge and to provide protection for Hall’s left flank. Reynolds then ordered Howard to move 
forward, which revealed his determination for an open battle but also his fear of the confederate 
forces. This is when, according to Coddington, the first crisis of the battle took place. The major 
concern was whether Reynolds could hold the line on his own or not. Cutler’s men barely had 
time to deploy before the Confederates advanced into easy musket range. A major volley ensued, 
and Reynolds was killed. The Union was able to push them into the woods, but they were met 
with resistance on Cutler’s right flank. The timely charge of the 2nd Wisconsin allowed them to 
roll back the right flank of James Archer and eventually was able to devastate his forces and take 
a good number of his soldiers as prisoners of war.86 Despite this success, Cutler was still facing 
major troubles. His 1st Division was at risk of losing if he did not receive assistance immediately. 
General Rufus Dawes arrived with this help. He started from the left flank and ran his troops 
along the depression between Seminary Ridge and McPherson’s Ridge towards Chambersburg 
Pike. The confederates tried to repulse them with a volley from railroad cover but that proved 
disastrous. Cutler with his troops from the 95th New York joined up with Dawes and then jumped 
the fence, laying crossfire against the confederates that led to the surrender of the 2nd Mississippi 
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led by Major John Blair.87 The events of the morning rapidly reached Meade. He heard of 
Reynolds’ death and the small victories of Cutler and Dawes. This is when he changed his plans 
entirely. He only sent troops to Gettysburg to scout a battlefield, he never anticipated conflict. He 
ordered a concentration of his army there and sent Winfield Scott Hancock to deliver his plans 
and to assume a place of command. Hancock had seen his plans and Meade believed that he was 
a capable officer. Hancock rode out for Gettysburg at 1:30 p.m.88 At 2:30 p.m. the fighting 
resumed, when Robert Rodes’ long lines of infantry emerged from the woods at Oak Hill. Gen. 
Abner Doubleday, who assumed command after Reynolds was killed, extended his line across 
Mumasburg Road and opened fire along Fairfield Road. During this conflict, they pushed their 
line out into the railroad cut, only to be pushed back to their former position. This happened 
several times throughout the skirmish. While this was going on, Rodes began making his final 
preparations for his attack. He placed George Doles’ troops to the right of Middletown Road in 
the valley, and marched against the enemy. Things quickly dissolved and fell apart, however. A 
fatal error was that Alfred Iverson had not led his troops in person. This left his left flank 
exposed, and the Union was able to come in and capture a majority of the uninjured soldiers in 
Iverson’s brigade.89 This is when General George Gordon was ordered to support Doles. He rode 
within nine hundred feet of the Union lines and using effective shock tactics, he attacked the 
First Brigade of the Union and forced them to retreat towards Cemetery Hill. General Early had 
arrived at this point and Coddington writes that this “advance could not have been better 
synchronized if Lee had been in position to issue all orders to his commanders at once.”90 
Meanwhile, Cutler was meeting resistance from Julius Daniel. Cutler’s men fought him savagely 
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and skillfully, inflicting heavy losses and forcing him back. The confederacy then increased 
pressure and forced the Union to make a final stand at Seminary Ridge. They took advantage of 
the barricade that the fences provided and fought back. Their line collapsed, however, and they 
were forced to retreat to Cemetery Hill under orders from Oliver Howard. The confederates saw 
this as a fearful retreat but Howard called it a tactical retreat to join up with other forces and 
regroup. This ended the first day of the Battle of Gettysburg.91 Howard met with great criticism 
from other officers saying that he had faulty lines and that he did not wait for reinforcements 
from Doubleday.  Lee, despite the retreat of the Union, did not pursue them. He was wary of the 
number of reinforcements that may have been at Cemetery Hill, but the truth of the matter is, he 
very well may have been able to take Cemetery Hill if he had pursued them immediately. He 
chose to stop the advance and regroup. The retreat began at 4:00 p.m. and by 5:25, the Union had 
met up with reinforcements and made it hard for the Confederates to assault them.92 Lee’s unease 
and delay proved to be a vital setback for the Confederacy because Cemetery Hill would prove to 
be valuable to the eventual Union victory at Gettysburg.  
The second day of the battle was even more intense, because Meade was invested in 
defending Gettysburg and Lee was invested in taking it. Meade decided to fight at Gettysburg 
due to intelligence that suggested that Lee was bringing up the rest of his army. The major 
players were very similar to the first day with officers like Cutler and Doubleday, but it also 
included other officers like Daniel Sickle, G.K. Warren, Strong Vincent, Joshua Chamberlin, 
Andrew Humphries, and with George Meade in command. The major players on the Confederate 
side included James Longstreet, Edward Johnson, Richard Ewell, William Oates, and Robert 
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Rodes. The battle would take place at Peach Orchard, Little Round Top, Big Round Top, and end 
at Cemetery Ridge and Cemetery Hill. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When Meade arrived at Gettysburg, the first thing that he did was survey the field. He 
determined that the Union should place a grave importance on Cemetery Hill, place artillery on 
Cemetery Ridge, and capitalize on the advantage that the terrain provided. His strategy initially 
was to attack Ewell’s forces using his right flank. Meade understood the importance of a strong 
right flank, and he decided to take a defensive approach until he knew the strength of the 
Confederate forces.93 Daniel Butterfield, an advisor to Meade, claimed that Meade had planned 
for a retreat before the battle even started. Meade denied this and upon further investigation after 
the war, it was proven that Meade only suggested that they be prepared should the need arise but 
he was determined to hold Gettysburg.94 By 5:00 a.m. Meade had arrived at the battlefield. 
While Meade was planning his defense, Lee was planning his assault. He opted not to attack 
Cemetery Hill, but rather decided to see what Meade would do. He said that if the enemy is still 
there in the morning, then they would attack. General James Longstreet suggested that they 
attack using a sweeping motion and attack on the Union left. Lee ultimately decided to stay at 
Gettysburg and went to talk with Ewell. He planned to assault Cemetery Hill at daylight, and 
Ewell did not like this. He thought that an attack from the left would prove more deadly than an 
attack from the right. Ewell eventually agreed to his plans but with great reluctance. This is when 
Lee began to have second thoughts, and sent Ewell orders to retreat to the confederate right, 
because intelligence suggested that Culp’s Hill was unmanned and that it was a good place to go. 
If they were able to capture Culp’s Hill, then Cemetery Hill would be untenable. After midnight, 
he ordered Johnson to attack Culp’s Hill but much to the surprise of Lee, the Union beat him 
there. Lee then revoked his order 
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to move Ewell to the right, keeping him near Cemetery Hill. His plan was to assault the Unions 
left flank and capture Cemetery Hill.95  
At 4:00 p.m. Longstreet’s men opened fire on the Union batteries, charging in close ranks and 
trying to take the hill. The Union used the terrain and their height to their advantage. No ground 
was received or given by either side. The first crisis of the day occurred at Daniel Sickles’ 
extreme left, which would become known as the Battle of Little Round Top. Meade ordered 
Warren to back up the left at Little Round Top and Warren suggested that they capture the hill at 
Emmetsburg Road. 96 The occupation of Little Round Top was a combination of circumstances 
and a stroke of luck. Warren was waiting for reinforcements and they arrived under Col. Strong 
Vincent. He arrived just in time to stop the assault and push the Confederates away from Little 
Round Top.97 During this battle, the confederates were attacking Big Round Top. William Oates 
argued that it was an important position for the Confederates. Oates had the advantage in 
numbers but Joshua Chamberlin had position. Chamberlin stretched his line to the left to defend 
against Oates. Each time the Confederates attacked, the Union repulsed them. Once the 
confederates were weakened, Chamberlin ordered a swift counterattack and Oates men 
surrendered. This is when the Union line at Little Round Top began to crumble, but Warren 
arrived with reinforcements. He attacked the troops along Peach Orchard Road, which blocked 
the confederate counterattack.98  This is when the second crisis took place-- the Union’s front 
line was disintegrating. Sickles tried to strengthen his left, and Meade sent a message to Sickles 
to send all of his troops to the Union left and to hold it at all costs. While this was happening, the 
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confederates were facing struggles as well. Their assault had not gone as planned. The Union 
defense of Little Round Top had ruined Hood’s plans to attack the right, Longstreet was eager to 
attack Cemetery Hill, and the confederates were meeting resistance on multiple fronts. The next 
major conflict came from Caldwell’s line. Longstreet assaulted his line while Caldwell sent his 
men to route the confederates in the Devil’s Den. No one expected an attack from the Peach 
Orchard, and they were forced to retreat back to Little Round Top. Longstreet took this 
opportunity to fall back to the Peach Orchard and regroup.99 This is when the Union faced its 
third crisis and their biggest challenge of the day. Confederate forces attacked Humphries at 
Peach Orchard. Humphries was prepared and formed a new line to defend against them, but he 
received orders to move back to the crest of Cemetery Ridge. Humphries forces were attacked 
while they were moving and it led to the collapse of the third corps at Peach Orchard. The 
confederates then attacked Freeman McGilvery at Peach Orchard. He met heavy resistance until 
Hancock arrived with reinforcements. Along with Humphrey’s forces they were able to force the 
confederates back towards Plum Run and hold them there.100 The day culminated at Culp’s Hill 
and Cemetery Hill. Both hills were being assaulted and Hancock sent two regiments to go to 
Culp’s Hill but only one of the regiments made it there. The other went to Cemetery Hill. Union 
artillery was the main defense of the hill until reinforcements could arrive. Despite the lack of 
confederate artillery, Ewell decided to assault the hill. Ewell was not aggressive enough, 
however. When Rodes went to shift his position after dark, he did not give himself enough time 
to get into formation. The battle was over by the time he arrived. Johnson’s advance did not go 
as planned either. It was dark by the time that his troops arrived. The confederates missed a big 
opportunity that day. The chance to envelope the Union right was lost and they failed their 
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objective to capture Cemetery Hill.101 Casualties on both sides were massive, and the stage was 
set for the final day. Johnson had a foothold at the bottom of Culp’s Hill and Longstreet had a 
desirable position at the Peach Orchard. Meade had the higher ground at Cemetery Ridge and 
had a noticeable advantage.  
The third day began with Meade and Lee planning for the day. They both knew the importance 
of Culp’s Hill and that would be the stage of the battle. The major players for the Union would 
remain very much the same, but on the Confederate side we see the infamous man named 
George Pickett enter the fray. The battle mainly takes place along Cemetery Ridge and Cemetery 
Hill, and would be the decisive skirmish of Gettysburg.  
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The battle began around 4:30 am with Union battery fire. Johnson then assaulted the hill 
with heavy musket fire, and ultimately failed. He continued pressing the line through means of 
small arms fire until 8:00 a.m. when he assaulted the hill once again. William’s retaliated with 
heavy musket fire from all sides and forced the confederacy back, breaking their offensive. The 
Union fought a well-coordinated battle, save for one small episode. There was a skirmish line 
drawn to probe the enemy defenses, and they were heavier than they anticipated. The 2nd 
Massachusetts was forced to fall back to the hill, giving up all ground gained during the 
skirmish.102 The battle as a whole was over by 11:00 a.m. The Union gained what they had lost 
and the confederates gave up their effort to take Culp’s Hill. This is when Meade began planning 
the defense of Cemetery Hill. He placed multiple batteries there and began to strengthen the left 
because he thought Lee would attack there again. This proved to be the case. Before the battle 
began, Longstreet wrote a letter to General Alexander telling him to not let Gen. George Pickett 
charge if there was no artillery fire that devastated their forces. It was meant to be as a last resort. 
Longstreet was losing his nerve, and it showed. Around 1:00 p.m. Longstreet’s forces opened 
fire at the Union line at Cemetery Hill. He bombarded the Union lines with artillery fire. 
Hancock later said that this was heaviest artillery fire that he had ever seen. He thought that Lee 
put a lot of reliance on this fire, but in the end it was to no avail. Nine tenths of the shots flew 
over the Union line at Cemetery Hill. Alexander would later write that the Confederates missed a 
rare opportunity when they did not take advantage of their exterior lines to aim more of their 
guns towards the hill. Hunt, in return, did not return fire at full strength. He resorted to slow and 
carefully aimed shots in order to give them a false sense of security and hoping to urge them to 
advance prematurely.  
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After the Union fire ceased, Alexander wrote to Pickett saying that if he was going to 
charge, he should do so now.103  Longstreet was nervous, he said to Alexander, “I do not want to 
make this attack… I believe it will fail… I do not see how it can succeed… I would not make it 
even now, but that General Lee has ordered and expects it.”104 Pickett, along with Pettigrew, 
charged Cemetery Hill. Union artillery resumed fire, but Pickett’s men pressed on. Coddington 
comments on the fact that nobody really knew where Pickett went. He says that reliable 
witnesses saw him ride into battle, but others told how he came back dejected and forlorn. 
Everyone says that they seemed to have lost him in the smoke.105 As Pickett’s forces came over 
Emmetsburg road, McGilvery’s batteries opened fire on him. The confederates could not return 
fire in equal volume; they had used their ammo stores in the earlier assault. This is when the first 
signs of faltering appeared for the Confederates. The heavy artillery fire from the right was 
becoming a major issue for them. They also met trouble from Union General Alexander Hays, an 
Irishman from Pennsylvania. He charged the field, telling his men to pick up weapons, load 
them, and return fire. He charged with tenacity and provided a decent cover for the other infantry 
units.106 The Union defense was near impregnable, save for one weak spot. There was a weak 
point near a clump of trees, but Hancock did nothing to remedy it. The Confederate infantry 
struck there soon after. The Second Corps defended the area, using their strong lines to act as 
swinging doors and collapse the confederate line from both sides. They held the Confederates at 
bay and then began their assault on the Confederate left. As Hays was attacking the left, another 
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force was making its way to Pickett’s right flank.107 Despite the heavy Confederate losses, they 
kept pressing on. They pressed the hill after the artillery stopped, but they were met with heavy 
resistance. They charged with the bayonet, but were gunned down by Union forces quickly. 
Once the cannonade died down around 3:00 p.m. the main action between the opposing cavalries 
took place. They fought in the open fields near Hanover road. After heavy bouts of hand to hand 
combat, both sides retreated back to their lines. This is when all hope seemed lost for the 
Confederate forces. Lee pulled his forces back in full retreat, and Meade did not pursue 
counterattack. This would prove to be a grave error on the part of Meade.108  As Lee was 
retreating, he turned to one of his officers named Colonel Fremantle saying, “This is a sad day 
for us Colonel, a sad day; but we can’t expect always to gain victories.”109 On July 4, the 
nation’s birthday, Lee completely pulled out of Gettysburg and began his journey back towards 
the Potomac. He was convinced that the defense there was impregnable and decided to cut his 
losses and retreat. Meade said in his congratulatory order that their task was not yet complete and 
that they had to “drive from our soil every vestige of the presence of our invader.”110 Lincoln 
received this order at the telegraph office with joy until he got to the line about driving the 
enemy from our soil. Lincoln was recorded saying, “Drive the invader from our soil! My God! Is 
that all?”111 Lincoln was not satisfied with repulsing the enemy, he wanted them captured and the 
war ended. However, this was not the day that the war would end.  
 Gettysburg was a battle that was pivotal for the Union. This victory began a trajectory 
that would end with them becoming a real fighting force. After years of poor leadership, they 
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were seeing the beginnings of actual leadership. They would not reach their full potential until 
1864, however. They would have to suffer poor leadership for just a while longer. The 
Confederates had suffered a major defeat, one from which they will never recover. Lee would 
continue to be an effective leader, but as mentioned above, Longstreet began to show the same 
signs as McClellan. He was unsure of his chances of victory and it almost ended with him 
retreating prematurely. What separates him from McClellan is the fact that he did not back down, 
regardless of his fear. Meade also made a mistake that McClellan made. At Antietam, McClellan 
was content with seeing his enemy flee and did not pursue them. Meade did the same thing after 
Gettysburg. This battle would be analyzed for years. One writer for the New York Tribune wrote 
on July 1 that the invasion would actually aid the war effort in the North. He reasoned that a 
Southern invasion would lessen the wickedness of the North invading the South, it would further 
encourage the draft, and even encourage allowing former slaves into fight.112  The Harrisburg 
Telegraph wrote on July 7 claiming that Confederate invasion of the North destroyed any claims 
of the South’s fight for constitutional rights. He argues that once they crossed the Potomac, it 
became about destroying the North and not about rights.113 The New York Times also wrote on 
July 7, stating that the Union Army redeemed itself after many losses prior to Gettysburg.114  
Another critic of the battle was Pickett himself. He blamed Lee for the loss, stating “That old 
man had my division slaughtered at Gettysburg.”115 He fell into depression after this battle and 
for good reason. Lee’s decision to send him in would prove to be the undoing of the Confederate 
invasion. Meade went on to write  “Our own losses were very severe, amounting, as will be seen by 
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the accompanying return, to 2,834 killed, 13,709 . . . wounded, and 6,643 missing; in all, 23,286. . . . It is 
impossible in a report of this nature to enumerate all the instances of gallantry and good conduct which 
distinguished such a hard-fought field as Gettysburg. . . . I will only add my tribute to the heroic bravery 
of the whole army, officers and men, which under the blessing of Divine Providence, enabled a crowning 
victory to be obtained, which I feel confident the country will never cease to bear in grateful 
remembrance.”116  Lee also wrote about the battle saying, “The conduct of the troops was all 
that I could desire or expect, and they deserve success so far as it can be deserved by heroic valor 
and fortitude. More may have been required of them than they were able to perform, but my 
admiration of their noble qualities and confidence in their ability to cope successfully with the 
enemy has suffered no abatement from the issue of this protracted and sanguinary conflict.”117 
The gears were beginning to turn in favor of the Union. With Lee on the run, and Lincoln 
planning the next stages of the war, things were beginning to go the Union’s way. Gettysburg 
proved that the Union was capable of winning, capable of being a strong military force. Meade 
was strong, and unlike McClellan, he was willing to sacrifice anything to win. This tenacity was 
something that the Union lacked at this point. Lincoln was confident in Meade, but Meade 
ultimately was not the answer. Gettysburg was a turning point but not a stark one. It was merely 
a piece of a much bigger puzzle. It was a step in the right direction but not the solution to their 
problems. The only thing they lacked was a strong offensive leader, but that factor is just over 
the horizon. Their time is coming. 
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Section 4: Post-Gettysburg Leadership 
The days following Gettysburg were critical. Meade was trying to force Lee back over 
the Potomac without risking a battle. He was afraid that attacking Lee would mean defeat for 
him in the same way that he just attained victory. His defensive victory had ruined him as an 
offensive general. He continued to pursue Lee until they came to the Potomac. High waters had 
kept Lee from crossing and this, to Lincoln, seemed like a perfect opportunity for Meade to 
strike. Despite this, Meade still did not attack. He called a council of generals to decide whether 
to attack or not. They voted not to attack until they could find a weakness. While they searched, 
Lee escaped across the Potomac.118 Lincoln was greatly distressed by this, but he quickly began 
to formulate a new plan. This plan revolved around a recent victory in the West at Vicksburg by 
Grant. All during June, Grant kept a tight grip on Vicksburg through intense siege operations. On 
July 5, the day after Lee fled Gettysburg, Vicksburg fell. Before Lincoln knew of his success he 
said, “If Grant took Vicksburg, why Grant is my man and I am his the rest of the war.”119 Grant’s 
strategy was brilliant. He went down the west bank, crossed, and operated below Vicksburg. 
Lincoln wanted him to move and join up with Banks, but when he was successful Lincoln wrote 
him saying, “I now wish to make the personal acknowledgement that you were right and I was 
wrong.”120  His siege tactics proved successful and gave Lincoln the victory he desired. After 
this, Grant wanted to move on Mobile; Lincoln liked this idea but thought that Texas was a more 
important objective. Grant relented and gave his approval. This is when Halleck began to hatch a 
scheme to get Grant named the Commander of the Army of the Potomac, but Grant stated that he 
wanted to stay in the West. General William Rosecrans, who was in command in the West at the 
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time, was the opposite of Grant. Grant fought hard and did not pester Lincoln for reinforcements, 
but Rosecrans fought little and asked Lincoln for more troops often. He would often write 
Lincoln angry letters over the smallest details, thinking that the government was not supporting 
him properly.121 Rosecrans remained inactive for most of July, while fighting was raging in the 
East and the Union push south was commencing.  
In September of 1863, Rosecrans finally moved forward once again. He threatened 
Braxton Bragg’s army at Chattanooga , causing him to evacuate the city and fall back to the 
South. At this time Burnside was moving into East Tennessee from the north. Rosecrans brashly 
pursued Bragg southward, and they met at Chickamauga.122 The first day yielded no success for 
Bragg, but on the second day he made a complete break of the Union right. Reinforcements from 
Longstreet soon arrived and they swept the Union right, forcing Rosecrans to flee the battlefield 
and ride towards Chattanooga. As he fled, Gen. George Thomas stayed and fought. He held his 
own, but Rosecrans ordered him to retreat.123 Halleck realized, after this battle, that Chattanooga 
was an important city to hold in the West. He wrote to Lincoln telling him that Chattanooga 
provided a gateway into Tennessee and that it was vital for the Union to hold it. He also realized 
that it held great importance for the Confederacy as well and that they would surely attack it. 
Lincoln wrote to Halleck that if Chattanooga could be held, the rebellion would die and could 
only “eke out a short and feeble existence, as an animal sometimes may with a thorn in its 
vitals.”124 Lincoln ordered Burnside to join up with Rosecrans, but by the time that Rosecrans 
wrote Lincoln saying that he held Chattanooga, Burnside had not arrived. Lincoln was outraged, 
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and he wrote to Burnside wondering what happened. Burnside, hearing of Rosecrans that the 
Confederacy was in full retreat after Chattanooga, decided to move towards Jonesboro. Lincoln 
ordered him to meet up with Rosecrans once again, but once he realized that he was too far away 
to join him in short time, he decided to have Burnside hold the territory that he had captured.125 
When the confederates threatened their supply lines in Tennessee, Lincoln began to question 
Rosecrans. He then set into motion a complete change in the command system in the West. By 
mid-October, all departments and armies in the West were under the command of Grant. Grant 
then relieved Rosecrans and replaced him with George Thomas.126  
 While Lincoln was focusing heavily on the West, Meade was doing very little in 
the East. Meade had his eyes on Richmond, which made Lincoln uneasy. Much like he did with 
McClellan, Lincoln told Meade to focus on Lee not on Richmond. Meade said that he would act 
on this but as he advanced, his customary timidity asserted itself. Meade refused to entertain the 
idea that he might be able to attack and smash Lee.127 He and Lee jockeyed for positions in 
Northern Virginia. The only real contact that they made with Lee was in early October. Lee took 
advantage of the retrograde motion of the Union and began a pursuit of Meade. He only got as 
far as the Rapidan near Bull Run before he realized that Union defenses there were too strong 
and he checked his advance.128 Meade wrote Halleck on October 21, 1863 that the season for 
active campaigning was about over and that the forces needed to return towards Washington.129 
At this point, Meade’s failures in the east made him look all the more expectantly to Grant in the 
West. Late in November of 1863, Grant attacked Bragg south of Chattanooga and broke him 
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completely. Bragg fell back to Georgia and the Union finally had a grip on Tennessee.130 Bragg 
had sent some of his forces under Longstreet to attack Burnside, but Sherman was there to meet 
them. Longstreet retreated to Northern Virginia and Bragg asked to be relieved of command, one 
of the few major Confederate generals to be relieved up to this point. Johnson replaced him and 
acquired his troops.131 One might think that nothing has changed since Gettysburg. Meade was 
doing nothing, Rosecrans was insubordinate, and Burnside was not doing much good. The only 
good officer at this point was Grant, and Lincoln began to realize this. This is when the turning 
point that took place at Gettysburg began to come to fruition.    
The winter months of 1863-64 sparked a revival for Union command. Grant started to 
think about the bigger picture of the West, proposing an assault on Mobile. He proposed that 
Lincoln send a small force to the Tennessee line to defend it, and in the meantime they send a 
force down the Mississippi to New Orleans from where he would move to Mobile. He also 
brought up the topic of replacing the commander in the East. Grant suggested that Sherman take 
over for Meade. Lincoln presented one condition for his strategy. He wanted the remainder of the 
Confederates in Tennessee driven out and the troops in Georgia pushed so far south that they 
could never threaten Tennessee again. Sherman did not receive command of the East, however. 
Grant also presented some ideas for movements in the East. He recommended that they give up 
the attempt to capture Richmond from within Virginia. He instead proposed that they utilize the 
Navy against North Carolina, from which they would invade the state and threaten the railroad 
lines into Richmond cutting off supplies.132 Halleck did not like this plan, because it focused on 
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Richmond and not Lee, and he knew that Lincoln would not approve.133 Late in February, 
congress passed a bill that revived the Lt. General rank. Lincoln promoted Grant to this rank and 
by March, Grant replaced Halleck as the general in chief. Grant kept Meade in the East and 
appointed Sherman to command the West. The newly christened general in chief then put into 
place two large offensives in the West. He tasked Sherman with moving into Northern Georgia 
and destroying resources as he went, and Banks with moving on New Orleans en route to 
Mobile. The Mobile offensive did not take place, however. Banks was moving up the Red River 
into Louisiana in April, and was defeated there due to grave mismanagement on his part. Grant 
wanted him removed, but ultimately retained his command but placed E.R.S. Canby in charge of 
the Louisiana Campaign.134   
While the Union spent the winter planning, Lee spent his time rebuilding his forces for 
the defense of the South. At the beginning of March, confederate forces were estimated at 
344,000.135 By May 1, 1864, Grant was ready to attack Lee. Once he crossed the Rapidan, he 
attacked Lee there. Lee was prepared with Ewell’s and Johnson’s forces to meet them. The 
Union wanted to engage Lee’s right and force him into a battle against superior numbers. Lee 
met them near Chancellorsville and Grant engaged Ewell’s forces there. Ewell was able to push 
back Grant. They both entrenched and remained there for the rest of May 5th. On May 6th, the 
Union attacked again. Ewell was able to hold his position but Hill was pushed back. Longstreet 
arrived with reinforcements and broke Hancock’s advance. Longstreet was wounded, but 
continued to push forward. His advance was ultimately repulsed.136 As the days moved along, 
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Grant inched closer and closer to Richmond. His plan was to force Lee into a decisive battle, but 
Lee’s defensive prowess would not allow him this. Grant pushed Lee further and further back but 
he could not break his army. By the time June arrived, Grant had pushed his way to within nine 
miles of Richmond. Lee had fled back to the fortifications of Richmond and prepared for a siege. 
Instead of laying siege on Richmond, Grant decided to withdraw back across the James and 
move towards Petersburg. He did not capture Petersburg; the confederates held him off long 
enough for Lee to arrive.137 Lee dug in his troops and began his defense of Richmond. Grant then 
implemented a modified siege operation that cut off the railroads from the south of Petersburg.  
This is when Lee implemented a risky maneuver. He wanted to take the pressure off of 
Petersburg and Richmond by sending Grant back North. He did so by sending troops 
commanded by Early to assault Washington. He sent them through the valley, where Union 
troops were scarce and he easily crossed the Potomac.138  Grant sent two corps back to 
Washington, but he remained at Petersburg. He wanted to oversee the siege but he ultimately 
told Halleck that if Washington needed him, he would return to defend it.139 Early actually 
opened fire on Washington on July 11, but he soon realized the fortifications were too strong and 
he re-crossed the Potomac that same day. This is when Grant realized that he had to unify the 
troops in Washington by placing all the forces and commanders near Washington under one 
general. Lincoln chose Meade for this command. This way he ended two conflicts at once. He 
removed Meade from the Potomac, while in the meantime unified the forces at Washington.140  
Early began to move on Washington again, so Lincoln temporarily placed Halleck in command 
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of the defense of Washington. Grant wrote to Halleck and suggested that they place Philip 
Sheridan in command of the defense of the forces around Washington, and they were to pursue 
Early and fight them to the death.141 Sheridan did just that in September when he attacked the 
confederates at Winchester. He forced Early back towards the south and back across the valley. 
Also during this month, Sherman captured Atlanta, decimating Johnston’s forces as he went.142  
This is when Sherman presented a bold plan to Grant. He wanted to send Thomas back to 
Tennessee with 30,000 troops and to set up a defense there. Then Sherman would take the 
remaining forces and march across Georgia destroying resources as he went. 143 Grant initially 
did not like this plan, but ultimately he gave him the approval. Before Sherman invaded Georgia, 
Hood decided to invade Tennessee. He wanted to draw Sherman back to Tennessee and away 
from Georgia. Sherman trusted Thomas with the defense of Tennessee and did not return there. 
Hood suffered a major setback at Franklin, to the point where Hood had no chance to succeed. 
He invaded Nashville anyway and was decimated by Thomas’ forces. Despite his victory, he was 
relieved of command due to his lack of offensive prowess. His demotion, however, was delayed 
by weather and he was given a chance at redemption. Thomas attacked Hood on December 15, 
1864 and smashed through his line. Thomas gained a victory and left Hood with his army in 
shambles.144  
While Hood was being pushed out of Tennessee, Sherman was making his way through 
Georgia. His fabled “March to the Sea” was underway. He made his way south towards 
Savannah, torching all confederate resources and supplies as he went. Destruction was rampant, 
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and Sherman destroyed food supplies, munitions, railroads, and other necessities for the 
confederate soldiers quite liberally. Georgia was the main source of food for the Confederacy, so 
this was a major casualty for them.145 On December 20, 1864, Sherman captured Savannah 
which ended his march. He sent a letter to Lincoln presenting Savannah to the nation as a 
Christmas present. At this point, Sherman and Grant had already begun planning for the next 
thing. This is when things began to look up for the Union. They finally had a strong General in 
Chief, a strong leadership presence in the East, and they were winning battles. The strong 
offensive prowess that Grant offered was just what the Union lacked before with McClellan and 
Meade. Meade was a good defensive general but lacked that offensive component. Both Grant 
and Sherman had that offensive component that the Union desperately needed. This change is 
ultimately what led them to victory. 
 As 1865 rolled around, all that stood between the Union and victory was Lee and the 
defense he had set up at Petersburg. On March 25, 1865, Lee hurled his forces at the Union lines 
in front of Petersburg. His forces met the Union at the bank of the Appomattox River. He sent his 
forces out hoping to break the line. His forces were repulsed and his troops captured. On April 1, 
at the battle of Five Forks, the Union broke his right flank and swept through his line.146 Once 
Grant took his right, Lee knew that he could not stay in Petersburg. Petersburg and Richmond 
were evacuated, and by April 3, Richmond belonged to the Union. Jefferson Davis wrote in a 
letter to the people of the Confederacy, “The hopes and confidence of the enemy have been 
constantly excited by the belief, that their possession of Richmond would be the signal for our 
submission…” He also wrote in that same letter, “it is my purpose to maintain your cause with 
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my whole heart…”147 He was ready to stay the course till the end, and the end was approaching. 
On April 7, Sheridan pressed with one more attack which ended the resistance from the 
Confederates. On April 9, at Appomattox Courthouse, Lee surrendered to Grant thus ending the 
Civil War. 
 The years following Gettysburg were critical to the Union victory. Meade was thought to 
have been the hero of Gettysburg, but his fame did not last.  This is due to him making the same 
mistakes that his predecessors made. He got what Lincoln called “the slows” and that inhibited 
Union progress. He was fearful, slow to take offensive risks, and it ultimately extended the 
duration of the war, much like the officers that preceded him. The victory at Gettysburg was not 
fully utilized. Lincoln eventually saw this and began looking elsewhere for more offensive 
generals.  Lincoln found these generals in Grant and Sherman. Their intense tactics and their 
tenacity is what the Union needed. Sherman’s total war tactics and Grants siege maneuvers 
proved to be the undoing of the confederacy. They succeeded where McClellan, Meade, 
Burnside, and Hooker failed. They did not let fear of the enemy stop them, they did not let 
military politics define their strategies, they wanted victory at all costs and that is just what they 
obtained. Lee did what he had been doing the rest of the war, but the loss of Jackson and the 
Union gain of competent leaders was too much for him to overcome. Longstreet was much like 
McClellan, he was fearful and that impacted his leadership. These factors on both sides of the 
battlefield are key components in understanding the impact of good leadership and hoe it can 
affect the outcome of war.  
In conclusion, the Battle of Gettysburg marked the beginning of the turning point of the war. The 
Union leaders after Gettysburg and their methods were more offensive and tenacious than the 
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leaders before Gettysburg. The Confederates were stronger during the years before, when the 
Union leaders were weaker, and when the Union gained good leadership the southern leadership 
suffered. Leadership is what makes or breaks an army and Americans today can learn a lot from 
leaders of the past so that their mistakes are not repeated.      
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